The Economic Significance of National Border Effects
National borders diminish trade volumes.' Although an expanding literature has documented this effect across space and time, the economic significance of these findings remains unclear; no previous study has conclusively linked this empirical phenomenon to underlying, economically meaningful issues, such as the presence of distortionary barriers to trade, the magnitude of any adverse welfare consequences, and the likelihood of a role for policy.
The lack of evidence on interpretation of the "border effect" rests in large part on its definition: the extent to which the volume of domestic trade exceeds the volume of international By CAROLYN L. EVANS* 1291 trade .
2 It is thus a comparison of two trade volumes. A number of factors could cause the volume of domestic trade to exceed that of international trade: tariffs, regulatory differences, information cost differences, the "nationality" of a product, a high elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods (together with a small barrier to trade). The volume measure alone does not provide information on the relative importance of the myriad possible causal factors. Consider, for example, a border effect of 2.65, so that trade between two locations within a country is 2.65 times higher than trade between two locations in different countries, after controlling for distance, income, and alternative trading opportunities. What could cause such an effect? Consider the following explanations, all of which generate a border effect of 2.65:
Scenario 1: The goods produced by the two different countries are virtually perfect substitutes, with an elasticity of substitution (o 1. Do large border effects arise because of high perceived-price wedges between foreign and domestic products (Scenarios 2 or 3), or because imports and domestic goods are very close substitutes (Scenario 1)? 2. If price wedges are important, do they reflect distortionary barriers to trade (Scenario 3) or do they arise from nondistortionary factors, such as differences in transactions costs or product characteristics (Scenario 2) ? 3 This paper explores the economic significance of border effects by completing four exercises that address these two issues. The exercises in Section II, subsections A and B, directly address the first issue listed above: the relative importance of i mport-3 Throughout this paper, I will use the term "price wedge" or "price difference" in order to refer generally to the differences between the prices of imports and domestic goods, as perceived by the consumer. For only the case of purely distortionary, policy-imposed differentials, however, I will use the term "barrier." Transactions-cost or productcharacteristic differences, on the other hand, will be incorporated in the broader category of price wedges. This distinction is not only semantic. Barriers may imply welfare costs and policy actions, while transactions-cost or productcharacteristic differences imply neither.
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domestic price wedges, as opposed to a high elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods. The first exercise asks whether goods with lower elasticities have higher border effects; this observable relationship between border effects and elasticities allows me to infer the relative importance of unobservable price wedges, as opposed to elasticities. Border effects are, in fact, lower for less elastic products. This result suggests that the substitutability between domestic and foreign products is an important part of the reason why borders matter so much. Nevertheless, as the second exercise shows in Section 11, subsection B, under the assumption of any reasonable elasticity of substitution, implied price wedges between imports and domestic goods are far higher than recognized tariff barriers. The exercises in Section 111, subsections A and B, then address the second issue listed above: the reasons for these price wedges. First, in Section III, subsection A, I ask a very basic question: Does the border, in and of itself, create a barrier to trade ("location"), or do imports inherently differ from domestic products so that consumers purchase them less readily ("nationality")? The relative importance of these two factors is key to evaluating the economic significance of border effects: the importance of borders per se implies potential distortions, while a large role for nationality (as an inherent product characteristic) does not. To isolate these two factors, I use data on the sales of U.S. multinationals producing in foreign countries, in addition to data on sales of domestic firms and imports. Comparison of imports from the United States and sales of U.S. foreign affiliates isolates the "location" effect, controlling for "nationality," while examination of U.S. foreign affiliate sales versus those of domestic goods highlights "nationality,". controlling for "location." I find that borders per se rather than an inherent nationality difference hold more explanatory power.
Given that borders per se are so important in creating border effects, Section III, subsection B, evaluates two contrasting explanations of their impact. The first explanation focuses on differences in domestic and international transactions costs. If intranational transactions are less costly than international ones, border effects simply reflect a response to this differen- tial and are not indicative of barriers to trade, welfare costs, or a policy role. I examine language, national networks, and social capital as possible sources of the import-domestic differential. The second, alternative explanation argues that distortionary barriers explain the importance of borders per se. Policy-related factors, such as tariffs and nontariff barriers, create a downward impact on international trade flows. I find that both policy-related barriers to trade and transactions-cost differences play some role. I conclude that, while border effects may indeed imply some barriers, welfare costs, and a role for policy, any distortions are probably not as substantial as initial border results may have suggested.
Theoretical and Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis is based on a gravity model of trade, which predicts that the aggregate volume of trade between two places is determined by the income of the two countries and the distance between them.
4 I derive the estimating equation from a very standard model of trade in differentiated products, in which goods are differentiated by location of production s Trade between locations may encounter both transport costs and barriers to trade.
Working through such a model, assuming that a good g has a price of 1 in its country of origin, and taking logs yields the following expression for shipments between a producer c' and a consumer c:
(1) log SHIP,. = log Yc + log Y,-+ log A,.
here SHIP9~. is total purchases of the g good country c from a producer located in c', Yc the income of the importer, Yg, is the income the producer derived from sales of good g, Some common references include Jan Tinbergen 2) and Hans Linneman (1966) . Details on deriving the estimating equation are groin a Theory Appendix available from the author. For fional discussion, see Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krug-(1985) and Alan Deardorff (1995) .
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and Ag. and Ag are measures of a country's potential alternative trading partners; they measure the distance-weighted GDP of a given country from these alternative partners. o g is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of good g, and D9~. and Tg c . represent, respectively, transportation costs (either domestic or international) and other costs of international trade. These other costs of international trade could include a number of factors which would differentiate intra-and international trade, such as governmental barriers or differences in information costs. I assume that Tg c . = 1 for trade within a country, i.e., if c' = c. This variable (Tgc,) will capture differences between international and domestic trade. The "border effect" is the difference between local and international trade for two locations having identical values for all variables in the model other than Tgc . , i.e. vg log Tg c . .
The actual estimating equation will be of the form:
(2) log SHIPg,.
=a o +P,log GDP c + (3 2 109 PROD,.
The dependent variable (SHIP9~.) will be goods consumption by a country c of goods produced by producer c' in industry
The independent variables include production levels in the producing location (PRODS.) [given by data on industrial production (gross output for national production, total sales for foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals)], income ( GDP c ), and the distance between the 6 For the case of imports, I use bilateral industry-level i mport data. For a measure of "domestic trade," i.e., how much a country consumes of its own goods, I use data on national production (gross output) within an industry less total exports by that industry. For the case of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals, SHIPB~. is given by local sales of foreign affiliates within the host country. Note that the left-hand-side variable is local sales of foreign affiliates, while the right-hand-side production indicator is total sales by the foreign affiliates. These quantities correspond to domestic sales and total production in the case of domestic firms. Finally, the dummy variable LOCAL captures the differences in consumption levels depending on the source of production. LOCAL takes the value of 1 when the consumer and the producer are in the same location (i.e., country), and 0 otherwise. Thus, the magnitude of the border effect (exp(o -glog TB,.) in the theoretical model) will be exp(y), where y is the coefficient on the LOCAL dummy variable.
The sources for these data are described in a Data Appendix available at http://www.aeaweb. org/aer/contents/ . Sources include the following: Peter Richardus and Ron K. Adler (1972); Herbert G. Grubel and Peter J. Lloyd (1975) ; U.S. Bureau of the Census (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) ; World Values Study Group (1981 Group ( -1984 The measure of bilateral distance is the great circle distance, generally from capital to capital, between the two trading countries. For trade within a country, own distances are calculated as one-quarter of the distance to the nearest trading partner; for islands, own distance was calculated as one-half of the minor radius of the country. See Wei (1996) . The correct measure of domestic distance is a very important issue. See Volker Nitsch (2000a, b, c); Helliwell and Genevieve Verdier (2001) . As a check on my own results, I have reestimated all results using a measure proposed by Nitsch (2000a, b) , 1/1/fl X . The magnitude of the border effect increases, but, for the most part, the qualitative results do not change. An issue crucial to the economic significan of border effects is the degree to which hi border effects arise from high elasticities., substitution between imports and domes goads, as opposed to from high price wedg between the two.
9 It is i mpossible to ad this issue by merely observing the magnitude e The term "elasticity" refers to o' 8 , which is both elasticity of substitution between varieties of a parti good and the price elasticity of each individual v under common assumptions. See Helpman and Kru (1985) ) and the elasticity of substitution (v g ); thus, the magnitude of a given border effect in fact provides complete information on neither of these elements.
A. The Relation Between Elasticities and the Magnitude of Border Effects
In order to learn about the relative importance of elasticities and price wedges, it would be useful to know how elasticities are related to price wedges.
I°M ore specifically, I would like to know whether a given aggregate border effect due to high price differences on inelastic ucts or to lower differences on very elastic oducts, or to some combination thereof. nfortunately, this relation is not directly -se bl rvae. Instead, I analyze the relationship between 'der effects and elasticiti which is ob es, serv-;te. The border effect-elasticity relation is in--fi b veecause border effects increase with a in the elasticity only when high price 1?vans (1999) ) between domestic and international trade may vary systematically with the elasticity of substitution among varieties, either increasing or decreasing with a fall in elasticity (see Table 2 ). On the other hand, i mport-domestic wedges may not vary systematically with elasticities, such as with tariffs and national legal institutions. These three possible correlations are listed in the second column of Table 2 .
The relationship between border effects and elasticities will allow me to distinguish among these three cases, as shown in the third column of Table 2 . If price wedges which increase systematically with lower elasticities are important, then a lower elasticity should be associated with higher border effects (Case 1). On the other hand, if price wedges are fairly constant across goods, any small price difference would have a much lower effect for products that have lower elasticities (Case 2). Finally, if wedges are higher for more homogeneous (higher elasticity) products, more homogeneous products should have higher border effects (Case 3).
Thus, only if higher price wedges on differentiated (low elasticity) products have an effect outweighing any elasticity effect would higher border effects on more differentiated products be expected. In the contrary, if I do not observe this pattern, I should be able to reject that possibility. Note that this scenario (Case 1), in which low elasticity products have high border effects, may potentially be the most dire vis a vis barriers, welfare, and policy. It would show that aggregate border effects occur because of high price wedges; if these wedges arise from barriers to trade, adverse welfare consequences would follow. Rejection of this scenario would show that high border effects may arise at least in part because of elasticity effects, rather than primarily from potentially distortionary price wedges.
Results.-The data for this section are for eight OECD countries in 1990, across 12 industries. My proxies for differences across industries in elasticities include intraindustry trade as a proportion of the total trade within an industry,' industry R&D spending as a share of sales, and the ratio of advertising to sales within an industry.
13 I also utilize the measure of homogeneity of products proposed by Rauch (1999) . I calculated for each of the industries the percent of trade in products which he characterizes as not having either an organized exchange or a reference price, i.e., the products likely to have lower elasticities. Thus, a higher "Rauch index" indicates a less homogeneous (more differentiated) product.
I use the estimating framework of equation (2), with the following potential trading relationships:
(1) purchase of domestic goods; (2) bilateral imports from a sample of partner countries.
" Note that any conclusions on welfare follow only "if these wedges arise from barriers to trade." The second half of this paper addresses this issue in more detail.
' Z The proportion of intraindustry trade is calculated using the Grubel-Lloyd index as described in Hummels and James Levinsohn (1993) . 13 See Frederick M. Scherer and David Ross (1990), pp.
436-38.
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The LOCAL variable is defined as 1 for purchases of domestic goods and 0 for bilateral imports. To gauge the effect of the elasticity proxies on the impact of national borders, I include an interaction term, which is the LOCAL variable multiplied by the measure of interest. All measures vary between 0 and 1, with a higher index associated with a higher degree of differentiation (a lower elasticity). Thus, a positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that more differentiated (less elastic) products have higher border effects.
As shown in Table 3A , the results for all measures indicate that a higher degree of product differentiation is actually associated with a lower border effect.' 4 (Table 313 shows the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates.) For example, the coefficient of -1.54 on the Rauch variable indicates that a perfectly homogeneous product (R = 0) will have a border effect of exp(2.06) = 7.85, while a product with R = 0.5 will have a border effect of exp(2.06 -(0.5 X 1.54)) = 3.63. Thus, all variables yield consistent results suggesting that border effects fall with a higher degree of product differentiation. This suggests that high border effects are partially attributable to the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports, and that high border effects do not necessarily indicate large price wedges between domestic and foreign products.
Note that these results essentially rule out the case in which elasticity effects explain very little of the aggregate results (Case 1). In this case which has been eliminated, aggregate border effects would primarily be due to very high price wedges on inelastic products, and a given border effect could indicate very high barriers tò°
The estimation technique in this section and in Section III, subsection B, parts 1 and 2, is instrumental variables with population and population-based alternatives measures as instruments for GDP and GDP-based alternatives measures. Following James Harrigan (1995 Harrigan ( , 1996 , several endowment measures are used as instruments for production levels. Measures of the log of the number of workers, the log of the capital stock, and the log of agricultural land are interacted with industry dummy variables to create a set of 12 X 3 = 36 instruments for production. Industryspecific regressions of the log of production on the instruments yields R's ranging between 0.91 and 0.99. Industry fixed effects and distance-industry interaction terms are included.
red as 1 for purnd 0 for bilateral t of the elasticity ational borders, I
I n, which is the by the measure of between 0 and 1, ited with a higher lower elasticity). on the interaction differentiated (less r border effects. the results for all ,her degree of prodt y associated with a l e 3B shows the Orestimates.) For ex--1.54 on the Rauch fectly homogeneous e a border effect of Iroduct with R = 0.5 f exp(2.06 -(0.5 x miables yield consis--it border effects fall oduct differentiation. order effects are partsticity of substitution and imports, and that it necessarily indicate ;en domestic and foressentially rule out the effects explain very suits (Case 1). In this iinated, aggregate borily be due to very high -products, and a given ate very high barriers to
•. in this section and in Seen 1 2, is instrumental vartah mew'* ,n-based alternatives sbased alternative GDPgan (1995 GDPgan ( , 1996 , several for prodrre as instruments f the number of workers Notes: Industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific distance interaction terns included in all equations. IV with heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors. Instruments: GDP: Population; GDP-based alternatives measures: Population-based alternatives measures; Production levels: log of number of workers, log of capital stock, and log of agricultural land interacted with industry dummy variables (see Harrigan, 1995 Harrigan, , 1996 . * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level.
trade and large adverse welfare consequences (if the cause of the price wedges is in fact barriers to trade). 15 is However, the results do not eliminate any of three sible alternative scenarios: the two alternative cases led in Table 2 and one other subcase. This subcase is one which price wedges increase slightly with a fall in elasty, but where these effects are masked by the effects of 'ges on more elastic products. All three of these possible live cases, however, indicate that at least a portion of gate border effects arise from high elasticities of subon. In particular, even the subcase mentioned above sates that wedges which increase with a decrease in the city are not the major causal factor behind observed gate border effects, and it would not alter the final tation of the empirical result. A similar conclusion d apply to the case in which price differences vary -Pd b roucts, ut in no systematic relationship to elas- Notes: Industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific distance interaction terns included in all equations. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level.
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B. The Magnitude of Implied Barriers to Trade and Elasticities
The preceding results indicated that high border effects are at least in part due to elasticities; this section examines the extent to which the combination of reasonable elasticities and acknowledged barriers to trade actually does completely explain observed border effects. I first estimate industry border effects and then calculate total implied price wedges across industries, based on the measured border effect and the assumption of a "reasonable" elasticity of substitution. Comparing these overall implied wedges to actual tariff data yields an indication of the remaining "unexplained" price wedge.
Results.-The second column of Table 4A is the border effect for nonintra-EU trade for two nonadjacent countries for each industry in the sample, calculated as exp ((3L) , where (39 is the coefficient on an (i) 
BORDER EFFECTS, TARIFFS (PERCENT), AND PRICE WEDGES (PER, :NT) (IV)
Elasticities and price wedges (percent)
• Elasticities calculated based on Rauch index, which varies between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate more differentiated products.
Rauch index:
Max Min 1.00 0.03.
industry-dummy-variable-LOCAL interaction term. 1 6 Table 4B shows OLS estimates. The third column provides the average tariff for these countries in each industry. The subsequent columns calculate total implied ad valorem tariff equivalent price wedges~= expl -l -l ) for LLL IT R elasticities of 2, 5, and a range between these two numbers.
17 This "Total implied price wedge" is the overall price difference implied by the measured border effects, while the "Unexplained price wedge" is that portion of the to Full results for the regression are in Table At A. Table  A1B shows OLS estimates. Dummy variables for trade between two European Union countries and for trade between two adjacent countries are included in order to calculate border effects for nonintra-EU trade for two nonadjacent countries. 17 These calculations are only intended to provide a rough order of magnitude of implied and unexplained price wedges. The range of elasticities is based on the Rauch index, with the derived elasticities ranging between 2 and 5. The Data Appendix describes calculation of these elasticities. See Robert M. Stern et al. (1976) ; Clinton R. Shiells et al. (1986); Feenstra (1994) ; Hummels (1999) for estimates of elasticities.
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total not explained by the tariff barriers.' 8 Clearly, the total implied price differences are far larger than the actual tariff barriers. For example, while the average tariff in Wood Products and Furniture is 5 percent, the total implied wedges range between 61 percent and 228 percent. Across industries, in the calculations in which the elasticity ranges between 2 and 5, the portion of the total not explained by the combination of tariffs and reasonable elasticities (i.e., the "Unexplained price wedge") ranges between 36 percent and 172 percent. Thus, although elasticities are indeed part of the story, price wedges not explained by tariffs must still be nonnegligible.
III. The Reasons for Price Wedges
The findings above lead to the second crucial issue listed in the introduction: if price wedges are important, do they reflect distortionary bar , riers to trade or are they due to nondistortionary is 1 subtract the tariff levels from the overall implied price wedge. See Lee and Swagel (1997) factors, such as differences in transactions costs or product characteristics? Section 111, subsection A, examines the roles of both nationality as a product characteristic and of borders per se as a determinant of trade flows. Section III, subsection B, focuses on the relative importance of transactions-cost versus policy-barrier explanations for the effects of borders per se.
A. Nationality and Location
In the most general sense, when domestic goods are purchased more readily than imports, two types of differences between the o could exist:
19 Differences related to crossing the border, such as tariffs, nontariff barriers, regulatory differences, or lower within-country transactions costs ("location"). An inherent difference between domestic and foreign products ("nationality").
terms of equation (1) (1999, 2003) .
Elasticities and price wedges (percent)
Range (2 to 5) Elasticity = 5 1299 composed of two elements, "border wedges"
(T c , ) and differentials due to differences bet ween domestic and foreign products (Cg c -), such that Tg c • _ ,rgc, X C9~,. This distinction is i mportant for reasons related to both the welfare implications and the policy relevance of border effects. If borders per se in fact create border effects, distortionary barriers, governments, and policy potentially play an important role. On the other hand, if domestic and foreign products are indeed "different," border effects could reflect simply a market response to these differences. Welfare consequences of border effects should not be large, and the role of policy in the creation and alleviation of border effects may be minimal.
To address this issue, I utilize data on sales of U.S. multinationals producing in foreign countries, in addition to data on sales of domestic firms and imports. Using this information allows me to isolate the two broad potential sources of differences between imports and domestic goods. Comparison of imports from the United States and sales of U.S. foreign affiliates isolates the "location" effect, controlling for "nationality." Thus, if nationality effects alone explain border effects, borders should not matter at all when comparing consumption levels from these two sources. On the other hand, examination of U.S. foreign affiliate sales versus those of domestic goods highlights "nationality," controlling for "location." In this case, if borders alone explain border effects, and nationality plays no role whatsoever, borders should matter to the same degree when comparing imports from the United States to either local sales of foreign affiliates or to domestic sales.
Results.-The form of the test will again be a standard gravity-type model, as in equation (2), with three potential trading relationships: a country purchasing goods from its own domestic firms; a country consuming the goods of U.S. foreign affiliates producing within its borders; a country importing goods from the United States.
The variable LOCAL is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 when the producer and consumer are located in the same country, and 0 otherwise. Using imports as the benchmark, I examine the effects of consuming a domestic product and of consuming a good produced by a foreign affiliate located within national borders, with the variable LOCAL measuring these effects for both cases.
Thus, the test consists of running two separate equations simultaneously in a three-stage least-squares framework. The first equation contains data on imports from the United States and domestic sales; it measures the extent to which the volume of domestic trade exceeds international trade. The second contains data on i mports from the United States and on the local sales of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals producing within the foreign country. It measures the degree to which foreign affiliates local sales volume exceeds (or falls short of) the volume of imports from the United States. This second equation thus measures the "location" effect. I then compare the results of the two different equations to derive the "nationality" effect. Thus, for the most part, the "border effect" for foreign affiliates producing within a host country differs little from that for domestic firms. This result suggests that borders per se, rather than a nationality difference, are a more important part of the reason why borders matter.
B. Lower-Cost Domestic Transactions or Barriers to Trade?
This subsection explores two contrasting explanations of the importance of borders per se. Part 1 below evaluates the first explanation, which focuses on differences between domestic and international transactions costs. The alternative explanation, explored in part 2 below, argues that distortionary barriers, such as tariffs and nontariff barriers, explain the importance of borders per se. The economic significance of border effects hinges on the relative importance of these two alternative explanations. If transalternatives measures as instruments for GDP and GDPbased alternatives measures. Following Harrigan (1995, 1996) , several endowment measures are used as instruments for production levels. Measures of the log of the number of workers, the log 'of the capital stock, and the log of agd; cultural land are interacted with industry dummy variab to create a set of 7 X 3 = 21 instruments for producd Industry-specific regressions of the log of production on instruments yields R 2 s ranging between 0.82 and 0. Industry and year fixed effects and distance-industry in action terms are included.
z' For analysis which addresses the issue that the fore affiliates of multinationals could differ systematically other sources of production, see Evans (2003) . 
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Year fixed effects actions-cost differences underlie border effects, welfare consequences and policy implications '--miil b nmaecause the price wedge giving rise border effects simply reflects this transactionsst differential. If, on the other hand, distoronary barriers are important, border effects -l b pyarriers to trade, adverse welfare effects , dap otential role for policy.
Domestic Versus International Transac-
ns Costs .-I focus on three factors which ;Uld account for differences in international domestic transactions cost s: language "na-, a l n e t wo r k s , " a n d " s o c i a l c a p i t a l . " Di f f e r - 
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Notes:
Three-stage-least squares. Instruments: GDP: Population; GDP-based alternatives measures: Population-based alternatives measures; Production levels: log of number of workers, log of capital stock, and log of agricultural land interacted with industry dummy variables (see Harrigan, 1995 Harrigan, , 1996 . p-value is the probability associated with the hypothesis that domestic sales and foreign affiliate sales effects are equal. A low value indicates that we are able to reject that hypothesis, i.e. that the two differ from each other significantly. * Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
ences in language across countries may affect both information costs and the costs of writing any necessary contracts between international trading partners, thus creating a wedge between the costs of international and domestic transactions. "National networks" are links among citizens, including both informal ties and those created by national institutions and transportation networks; "social capital" refers to levels of t rust and norms among a nation's citizens. NO. 4 The measure of the role of language is a dummy variable indicating a common language between two countries. As for national networks, one measure is adjacency between two countries, since sharing a land border may encourage informal links between two locations. Second, membership in certain types of groups could tend to increase the density of informal networks . 24 My measure records the average number of religious or church organizations; education, arts, music, or other cultural activities; or youth work organizations per respondent to the World Values Survey, as reported in Knack and Keefer (1997) . Finally, measures of the density of national transport networks (kilometers of railroads and highways per thousand population) may indicate access to mobility which could facilitate the building of nationwide information or contact networks.
25
The first measure of social capital is a "social capital index" which includes measures of voter participation, newspaper readership, confidence in the administration of justice, society's respect for individual security, government focus on income redistribution, and equality of opportunity. 26 The next four measures of social capital countries in a trading-country pair, is included in a gravitystyle equation, with a bilateral-home interaction term also included, the bilateral measure is generally negative or insignificant, but the interaction term is generally positive, thus suggesting an increase in home relative to international trade. This result suggests that whereas a bilateral measure of social capital tends to reduce trade in general, it tends to increase domestic trade. These results may suggest that national borders may indeed indicate demarcations in social capital and national networks. Also see Helliwell (1998) . Note that such results also raise the issue of how and , Whether respondents differentiate between "foreign" and 'domestic" in answering the survey questions. 24 A Data Appendix, available at http://www.acaweb. ' aer/contents/, contains summary statistics for a number the transactions-cost proxies. zs Measures from Central Intelligence Agency (1990).
'~Based on the World Economic Forum (1990). Also Putnam (1993) , Helliwell and Putnam (1995 ), Knack Keefer (1997 ), and Helliwell (1998 . This measure, ich I have termed the "social capital index," is an average indicators of voter participation, newspaper readership, -d euce in the administration of justice, society's respect individual security, government focus on income redistion, and equality of opportunity, as reported in World ttuc Forum (1990) . Some indicators were rescaled the original numbers in the Report so that all range are taken from work by Knack and Keefer (1997) , with the original source as the World Values Survey. "Trust" indicates the percentage of respondents stating that most people can be trusted. "Civic cooperation" measures the norms of civic cooperation. 27 The next measure is the percentage of respondents in each country with either "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in various governmental and societal institutions. Finally, as membership in certain types of groups may "instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and publicspiritedness" (Putnam, 1993) , the measure of group membership described above also suggests the role of social capital.
To explore the relationship between some of these variables (all except language and adjacency) and border effects, I incorporate an interaction term between the proxy variable and the border effect variable (LOCAL). The coefficient on the interaction term indicates the effects of changes in the proxy on the border variable. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the proxy is associated with an increase in the effects of borders on trade flows. All variables are identified with specific countries, so that a positive coefficient on, for example, the trust variable, would indicate that countries with higher levels of trust tend to have higher border effects than do countries with lower levels of trust. Table 6A contains the results. [A benchmark is provided in column (i).] Table 613 shows OLS estimates. Sharing a common language tends to reduce the effects of borders. 29 As for the national network variables, adjacency between two countries tends to increase trade flows. Higher levels of group membership and density of both between 0 and 100, with a higher number indicating a higher level of social capital. Additional detail is available from the author upon request.
2 ' This measure "reflects respondents' own stated willingness to cooperate when faced with a collective action problem; it thus can be thought of as `trustworthiness,' " from Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1258) .
28 See Putnam (1993, pp. 89-90) . 29 I n column (ii), the coefficient on the LOCAL dummy variable provides the effect of borders for two countries which do not share a common language (border effectexp(1.42) = 4.14); for countries that do share a common language, it would be reduced by 0.60 (border effectexp(1.42 -0.60) = 2.27).
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!fore: Industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific distance interaction terms included in all equations. ' Significant at the 10-percent level. " Significant at the 5-percent level.
increase in the effects of borders for countries who are not members. The results for tariffs and the nontariff barrier coverage ratio show that the coefficient for neither of the two measures differs significantly from zero. 31 Overall, these results imply that policy-related barriers to trade may explain at least some part of the reason why borders per se affect trade flows, but that the overall impact of policy-related barriers may not be completely captured by officially measured barriers to trade.
C. Attribution and Welfare
An attribution of the effects of borders per se to policy-related factors versus transactionsst differences presents a challenge. However, tough division could provide useful informaon on the likely economic significance of these ects. Thus, I use the results of the preceding on to attribute an overall border effect to two competing explanations. To do so, I am to make two assumptions about the links between the proxies and transactions costs/barriers to trade: (1) that the EU dummy variable indicates the many unmeasured policy-related factors that may affect international trade flows; and (2) the combined effects of a common language and adjacency capture at least some of the differences between national and international transactions costs due to their effects on information costs and ties between parties. These calculations are only "back-of-the-envelope" results, at least in part because of these assumptions, but they do provide some rough numbers. In Table 8A , I first provide the overall effect of borders for two countries that are unrelated to each other (1). Table 8B Note: Industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific distance interaction terms included in all equations. Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. some rough welfare calculations." Assuming an elasticity of substitution of 5 and international transport costs of 8 percent, I find that gains to indirect utility from eliminating policyrelated distortions range between 6 percent and 10 percent for an average country. The lower bound assumes that the unexplained portion of the border effect is not policy-related, whereas the 10-percent figure assumes that it is entirely due to policy-related barriers. However, note that the policy-related change in the effects of borders is calculated based on the assumption that EU membership provides some indication of the magnitude of the effects of policy. As noted above, EU membership involves a variety of issues regarding the integration of nations that go beyond trade liberalization alone. Any conclusions on welfare effects must thus be tempered by consideration of the various impacts of such wide-ranging changes.
EVANS: NATIONAL BORDER EFFECTS
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The fact that national borders sharply reduce trade flows has received a great deal of attention, in large part because recent empirical findings could imply large barriers to trade, adverse welfare consequences, and a role for policy. As I discussed at the outset, however, no previous work has linked this empirical phenomenon to underlying, economically meaningful issues. To address the economic significance of national border effects, this paper provides evidence on two fundamental questions:
1. Do large border effects arise because of high perceived-price wedges between foreign and domestic products, or because imports and domestic goods are very close substitutes? 2. If price wedges are important, do they reflect distortionary barriers to trade or do they arise s° These calculations are made based on the expression for indirect utility in a theoretical model presented in an appendix available from the author. I hold constant income and the nontraded sector of the economy. The percentage change in indirect utility is the proportional change implied by a lowering of policy-related price wedges.
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from nondistortionary factors, such as differences in transactions costs or product characteristics?
To address the first question, I showed that border effects are in fact lower for less elastic products. This result suggests that the substitutability between domestic and foreign products is a part of the reason why borders matter so much. Nevertheless, under the assumption of a reasonable elasticity of substitution, implied price wedges between imports and domestic goods are far higher than recognized tariff barriers.
Regarding the reasons for price wedges, I found that inherent nationality differences are not an i mportant reason for border effects, while borders per se hold substantial explanatory power. Although the empirical framework did not allow for more explicit estimates of the effects of trade policies, the results showed that both policy-related barriers to trade and differences in international and domestic transactions costs he l to explain why borders per se matter so much. s Finally, recall the three scenarios presented at the outset. Scenario 1, in which high border effects arise almost entirely from high elasticities of substitution, provides at best a partial explanation of this phenomenon. In Scenario 2, primarily transactions-cost differences between foreign and domestic products create border effects; the data suggest that these explanations may explain around 46 percent of the effects of borders. Policy distortions, such as in Scenario 3, may explain around 34 percent. Thus, while border effects may imply distortionary barriers, welfare costs, and a role for policy, any distortions are probably not as substantial as initial border results may have suggested. Notes. Industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific distance interaction terms included in all equations. IV with beteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Instruments: GDP: Population; GDP-based alternatives measures: Populationbased alternatives measures; Production levels: log of number of workers, log of capital stock, and log of agricultural land interacted with industry du mmy variables (see Harrigan, 1995 Harrigan, , 1996 . * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. ' 
